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INTRODUCTION
The National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”)—now 78 years old—was
born of a need to mitigate disruption to the U.S. economy caused by unfair labor practices.1 In the wake of the Industrial Revolution, the United States experienced an employment climate where business owners became so focused on
production that they lost sight of basic human dignity.2 Employers grossly mistreated, underpaid, and overworked laborers as a matter of course.3 Laborers
were largely unskilled; many were illiterate, most were immigrants, and
none—individually—had the power to effect change.4 When acting collectively, however, these unskilled laborers revealed an unbridled potential to derail
the U.S. economy.5 With enactment of the NLRA, Congress sought to regulate
the abuses of management (and the resulting responses of united laborers) by
providing workers with greater power to negotiate the terms and conditions of
their employment.6 In the wake of the Industrial Revolution, such power was
most effectively conferred through protection of the collective bargaining
rights outlined in Section 7 of the NLRA.7
1

Enacted in 1935 to promote collective bargaining, the Act gave workers three significant
rights considered essential to equalizing bargaining power between labor and management:
(1) the right to organize; (2) the right to bargain collectively; and (3) the right to engage in
concerted activities such as strikes and picketing. See National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372,
§ 7, 49 Stat. 449, 452 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012)). Enactment of
the NLRA followed “a procession of bloody and costly strikes.” 74 CONG. REC. 2,371
(1935) (statement of Sen. Robert F. Wagner regarding § 7(a)).
2
See BENJAMIN J. TAYLOR & FRED WITNEY, LABOR RELATIONS LAW 10 (5th ed. 1987).
3
Id.
4
Id. at 11; see also JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN
NATIVISM 1860–1925, at 114 (paperback ed. 2002) (discussing the roles played by the unskilled, inexperienced European immigrants).
5
In the summer of 1877, the United States was brought to a standstill by the Great Railroad
Strike of 1877. This strike did not involve labor unions, but rather eighty thousand railroad
workers joined by hundreds of thousands of other Americans—employed and unemployed.
The strike and associated riots lasted forty-five days and resulted in the deaths of several
hundred participants, several hundred more injuries, and millions in damages to railroad
property. The unrest was deemed severe enough by the government that President Rutherford B. Hayes intervened with federal troops. 1877: THE GRAND ARMY OF STARVATION
(American Social History Productions, Inc. 1984), information available at
http://ashp.cuny.edu/ashp-documentaries/eighteen-seventy-seven/ (last visited Jan. 16,
2015).
6
See supra text accompanying note 1.
7
Employees have a right to engage in protected concerted activity under Section 7 of the
NLRA which states:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent
that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as
a condition of employment as authorized in section 158(a)(3) of this title.
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Today’s employment climate, however, is intensely dissimilar. Disruption
of the U.S. economy is more likely to come from failures of consumer confidence8 than from striking railway workers. Every employee with a computer,
smartphone, or social media account now has a virtual voice capable of changing the world.9 This virtual voice is a powerful tool for aggrieved workers because it provides them with the opportunity to engage in “brand-shaping” campaigns. Brand-shaping campaigns seek to equalize the bargaining power
between labor and management through viral action directed at altering consumer perception of a company’s image.
This note examines how the National Labor Relations Board’s (“NLRB”)
dated embrace of the way employees organize and communicate their understanding of the world is incompatible with the realities of twenty-first century
collective action. This note begins in Part I by exploring the conditions that
made the NLRA necessary. Part II continues by examining the evolution of
collective action. Part III lays out the NLRB’s framework for an acceptable social media policy. Part IV then analyzes the difficulties associated with implementing such policies, and Part V concludes with a discussion of the employer’s illusive protection from an employee’s opprobrious social media post.
This note concludes that the NLRB’s insistence on applying an industrialera view of collective action to a digital-age employment environment is akin
to forcing a square peg into a round hole. Such sorcery requires a reliance on a
fact-specific, case-by-case analysis that is both unpredictable and misguided.
The solution lies in NLRB endorsement of social media policies that clearly
explain Section 7 rights and then separately regulate nonconforming social media conduct. Such policies should begin by outlining the right to engage in collective action to improve the terms and conditions of employment, and then go
on to designate conduct outside those limits. This solution will account for the
inevitable conflict between an employee’s Section 7 right to communicate information that the employer seeks to shelter and the employer’s need to protect
its brand. This solution will account for the reality of how workers today organize and express themselves.
29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012). Section 158(a)(3) provides in relevant part: “It shall be an unfair
labor practice for an employer . . . by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any
labor organization . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (2012).
8
The 2008 “financial crisis springs from a catastrophic collapse in confidence.” Stephane
Dees & Pedro Soares Brinca, Consumer Confidence as a Predictor of Consumption Spending: Evidence for the United States and the Euro Area, INT’L ECON., Aug. 2013, at 1, 2
(quoting Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz).
9
“[S]ocial media have been heralded as the driving force behind the swift spread of revolution throughout the world . . . .” Julia Skinner, Social Media and Revolution: The Arab
Spring and the Occupy Movement as Seen Through Three Information Studies Paradigms 3
(Sprouts: Working Papers on Info. Sys., No. 11(169), 2011), available at http://sprouts.aisnet
.org/11-169.
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Where labor organizers of the twentieth century served as the primary catalyst for self-organization and concerted activity, today’s aggrieved worker is
more likely to organize and act in an online community.10 Twentieth-century
laborers harnessed the power of collective action, through unions, to strengthen
their negotiating position. Today’s laborers, however, are more likely to harness the power of “viral action,” through social media, to strengthen their negotiating position.11 The reality of viral action means that today’s employees have
access to a communication network exponentially larger and faster than that of
yesterday’s employees. Thus, NLRB protections of social media posts, like a
knife that cuts both ways, can be both a blessing and a curse for the distressed
laborer and the targeted business owner. To ensure that employer social media
policies protect the rights of both the employer and the employee, the NLRB
must consistently uphold policies that focus on informing employees of their
protected Section 7 rights, and then steadfastly hold employees accountable for
brand-shaping expressions that fall outside of those rights.
The goal, after all, is to protect the flow of commerce from the negative effects of unfair labor practices;12 the goal is not to stifle commerce with unpredictable mollycoddling.
I.

THE GILDED AGE: AN EMPLOYMENT ENVIRONMENT RIPE FOR REFORM

Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, the United States developed into
an industrial powerhouse.13 This era has come to be known as the Gilded
Age,14 and it was marked by exponential industrial growth15 and the creation of
10

Typical protected concerted activity involves union organizing, the discussion of unionization
among employees, or the attempt by one employee to solicit union support from another employee. But concerted activity need not involve a union. Activities by groups of employees unaffiliated with a union to improve their lot at their work place are deemed protected concerted activities.

DOUGLAS L. LESLIE, LABOR LAW IN A NUTSHELL 85 (4th ed. 2000).
11
“Like record stores and time-bound television, the labor union as an organizing device
has outlived its usefulness: people simply don’t need intermediaries to organize them into
groups anymore.” Tom Hayes, Will Facebook Replace Labor Unions?, HUFFINGTON POST
(Feb. 28, 2011, 3:29 PM), www.huffingtonpost.com/tom-hayes/_b_828900.html. “Social
networking sites allow a union organizer to short circuit what in the past may have taken
months or years of legwork.” Marissa Oberlander, An Unlikely Union: Social Media and
Labor Relations, MEDILL REP. CHI. (Jan. 12, 2011), http://news.medill.northwestern.edu
/chicago/news.aspx?id=176075.
12
The purpose of the Act as stated in its preamble and evidenced by its long title is “[t]o
diminish the causes of labor disputes burdening or obstructing interstate and foreign commerce.” National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2012)).
13
CYNTHIA L. CLARK, THE AMERICAN ECONOMY: A HISTORICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 587 (Rev.
ed. 2011).
14
Id. Mark Twain coined this term to describe the “unabashed desire of the wealthy of this
era to broadcast their status through extravagant opulence.” Opulence in the “Gilded Age”,
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vast income inequalities.16 Entrepreneurs like Andrew Carnegie (in steel), John
D. Rockefeller (in oil), and Cornelius Vanderbilt (in railroads) amassed incredible fortunes while, at the same time, scores of immigrants lived in abject poverty.17 The rampant use of unethical, exploitive, and illegal business practices
throughout this period gave rise to many Gilded Age capitalists being branded
as “robber barons.”18
Although U.S. wages for some industrial workers grew 50 percent from
1860 to 1890,19 the poorest of common laborers averaged 40 percent less income than the general slum-dweller.20 More and more, increased mechanization undercut the need for skilled labor,21 and factories became assemblages of
unskilled laborers performing simple and repetitive tasks under the direction of
skilled foremen.22 Many of these workers were pulled from the swarms of immigrants and refugees entering the country in search of a better life.23 Many
were poor peasants and rural laborers from southern and eastern Europe who
were qualified for little more than unskilled manual labor in mills, mines, and
factories.24 These workers were often easy to exploit because most were illiterate, impoverished, and non-English speakers.25 Consequently, these laborers
had insignificant power and inconsequential influence to alter the terms and
conditions of their employment.

1890, EYEWITNESS TO HISTORY, http://www.eyewitnesstohistory.com/gildedage.htm (last
visited Jan. 16, 2015).
15
CLARK, supra note 13.
16
Timothy Noah, The United States of Inequality, SLATE (Sept. 3, 2010, 3:06 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/the_great_divergence/features/2010/the_un
ited_states_of_inequality/introducing_the_great_divergence.html.
17
PAUL KRUGMAN, THE CONSCIENCE OF A LIBERAL 18–20 (2007).
18
See, e.g., Lida F. Baldwin, Unbound Old Atlantics, 100 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 679, 683
(1907) (“We hear now on all sides the term ‘robber barons’ applied to some of the great capitalists. . . . ‘The old robber barons of the Middle Ages who plundered sword in hand and
lance in rest were more honest than this new aristocracy of swindling millionaires.’ ”) (quoting the August, 1870 issue of The Atlantic Monthly; writing in 1907 about how little business had changed in thirty-five years).
19
“The average daily wage made an estimated net over-all advance between 1860 and 1890
of roughly 50 percent for manufacturing and 60 percent for building trades workers.”
CLARENCE D. LONG, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, WAGES AND EARNINGS IN THE
UNITED STATES: 1860–1890, at 13 (1960).
20
HIGHAM, supra note 4, at 66.
21
Id. at 114.
22
Id.
23
Id. at 65.
24
Id. at 114.
25
Id. at 66.
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A. Securing Public Support
Unfortunately for them, the political and judicial ideology of the Gilded
Age overshadowed workers’ rights and held that freedom-of-contract principles
justified laborers working under whatever conditions they personally negotiated and accepted.26 In truth, most of them had no choice but to accept whatever
job they were able to find in order to provide for their families—even if it
meant working long hours, for little pay, under conditions devoid of basic dignity.27
Take for example the story of the Triangle Waist Company, a garment factory in the heart of New York City.28 The factory workers were mostly women,
at least one of whom was only thirteen years old, and they were largely recent
Italian and European Jewish immigrants who had emigrated to the U.S. with
their families in hopes of realizing the American Dream.29 Instead, they suffered under crushing poverty and deplorable working conditions.30 On March
25, 1911, 148 of the 600 laborers crammed into the upper floors of this urban
factory lost their lives to a fire cloaked in business negligence and greed.31
Many of the garment workers died leaping from ninth floor windows to avoid
the searing flames.32 Later, workers who survived this tragedy reported that the
ninth floor doors, which led to safety, were locked.33 According to the reports,
the owners frequently locked these exit doors to prevent workers from stealing
materials.34
This tragedy highlights the inhumane working conditions imposed upon
industrial workers in the years before enactment of the NLRA. “To many, its

26

See, e.g., Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 173 (1908) (“The right to purchase or to
sell labor is part of the liberty protected by [the Fourteenth] Amendment . . . .” (quoting
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905))); Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53 (“The general right to
make a contract in relation to his business is part of the liberty of the individual protected by
the 14th Amendment of the Federal Constitution.”) (citing Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S.
578 (1897)).
27
See, e.g., ROSE COHEN, OUT OF THE SHADOW 108–14 (1918).
28
141 Men and Girls Die in Waist Factory Fire; Trapped High Up in Washington Place
Building; Street Strewn with Bodies; Piles of Dead Inside, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1911, at 1.
29
Id.
30
See id.
31
Id. “One hundred and forty-one of them were instantly killed, either by leaps from the
windows and down elevator shafts, or by being smothered. Seven died in the hospitals.” New
York Fire Kills 148: Girl Victims Leap to Death from Factory, CHI. SUNDAY TRIB., Mar. 26,
1911, at 1.
32
New York Fire Kills 148, supra note 31; 141 Men and Girls Die in Waist Factory Fire,
supra note 28.
33
The Triangle Factory Fire: Investigation & Trial, CORNELL U., http://www.ilr.cornell.edu
/trianglefire/story/investigationTrial.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2014).
34
Id.
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horrors epitomize the extremes of industrialism.”35 These exploited workers
rightfully believed that organizing with fellow workers and speaking out about
the terms and conditions of their employment could end in one of two ways:
either with the loss of a desperately needed job or with management agreeing
to inconsequential, unenforceable concessions.36 Accordingly, many Triangle
Waist workers believed that the risk of the former did not justify the significance of the latter, so they continued to report to work each day and to endure
personal indignities and severe exploitation.
Where laborers chose to organize and negotiate as a single unit, the primary method used to effect change was to strike: to withdraw all labor and cause a
cessation of production.37 Such actions were fraught with risk and sacrifice for
both the laborers and the employers. The laborers risked losing their jobs and
being blacklisted from future industry employment,38 and the employers were
forced to decide between accepting the costs of giving in to the strikers’ demands or suffering the cost of the lost production.39 Because skilled workers
were difficult to replace, they were the first groups to find success with this
method of collective action.40 However, the absence of enforceable legislative
protections of worker rights meant that unskilled laborers—who were easy to
replace and exploit—had substantially less success improving the terms and
conditions of their employment.41
Although extreme examples like the Triangle Waist fire galvanized public
support for labor reform,42 meaningful judicial and legislative support were still
years away.

35

The Triangle Factory Fire: Introduction, CORNELL U., http://www.ilr.cornell.edu
/trianglefire/story/introduction.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2014).
36
“In 1909, an incident at the Triangle Factory sparked a spontaneous walkout of its 400
employees. The Women’s Trade Union League, a progressive association of middle class
white women, helped the young women workers picket and fence off thugs and police provocation.” The Triangle Factory Fire: Sweatshops & Strikes Before 1911, CORNELL U.,
http://www.ilr.cornell.edu/trianglefire/story/sweatshopsStrikes.html (last visited Oct. 18,
2014). By 1911, though the Triangle Factory was still a non-union shop, some of its workers
had joined the International Ladies’ Garment Workers Union. Id.; see also William Greider,
“Who Will Protect the Working Girl?”, Introduction to LEON STEIN, THE TRIANGLE FIRE xi,
xiv–xv (Centennial ed. 2011).
37
See, e.g., Greider, supra note 36, at xiv.
38
Id.
39
Worse yet, labor disputes often erupted into violent riots aggravated by employer-hired
paramilitary units, like the Pinkerton Detective Agency, used “to bust strikes—often by busting heads.” Strike at Homestead Mill: The Hated Men in Blue, AM. EXPERIENCE,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/carnegie/sfeature/mh_blue.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2015).
40
TAYLOR & WITNEY, supra note 2, at 11.
41
Id. at 11–12.
42
Greider, supra note 36, at xv.
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B. Evolution of Judicial Support
For much of the nineteenth century the courts applied an ideology that was
overtly hostile to organized labor; in 1806, a Philadelphia court went so far as
to convict striking workers of criminal conspiracy.43 Although this judicial
treatment of strikers as criminal conspirators was diluted nearly forty years later in Commonwealth v. Hunt,44 the doctrine was nonetheless applied as late as
1867.45 Ten years later, the courts began to move away from criminal sanctions
as a means to control disgruntled workers, and began to use an approach
gleaned from tort law: “the speedy, flexible and potent weapon of the injunction.”46 The courts began issuing injunctive relief to halt concerted activity, and
justifying those decisions with the common-law principles of nuisance, trespass, and interference with advantageous relationships.47
This approach, as it turned out, was similarly unpalatable to the labor
movement. “After the criminal sanction had been replaced by the injunction,
the courts had continued to act far beyond their range of competency; adjudicating without standards, without principles, and without restraint.”48 Now emboldened by the doctrines of civil conspiracy, the courts began to pass judgment both on the means used or contemplated (strikes and boycotts) and the
ends sought (workforce organization).49 The Supreme Court declared that the
law “prohibits any combination whatever to secure action which essentially obstructs the free flow of commerce between the states, or restricts, in that regard,
the liberty of a trader to engage in business.”50
43

Commonwealth v. Pullis, (Philadelphia Cordwainers’ Case), Philadelphia Mayor’s Ct.
(1806). This case was not tried in a court of record, and thus an official written decision was
not preserved; for a synopsis of the trial based on a contemporary account, see The Trial of
the Boot & Shoemakers of Philadelphia, on an Indictment for a Combination and Conspiracy to Raise their Wages, in 3 A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY
59 (John R. Commons et al., eds. 1910).
44
Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass. 111, 134 (1842) (holding that to find a union unlawful
under the conspiracy doctrine the courts must find the objectives and/or activities of a union
unlawful).
45
State v. Donaldson, 32 N.J.L. 151, 158 (1867) (holding “the object of the combination . . .
was to occasion a particular result which was mischievous, and by means which were oppressive”); Russell A. Smith, Significant Developments in Labor Law During the Last HalfCentury, 50 MICH. L. REV. 1265, 1266 (1952).
46
Smith, supra note 45.
47
Bhd. of Maint. of Way Emps. v. Guilford Transp. Indus., 803 F.2d 1228, 1230 (1st Cir.
1986) (citing In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895)).
48
HARRY H. WELLINGTON, LABOR AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 39 (1968).
49
See, e.g., Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229, 261–62 (1917) (holding
that “yellow-dog contracts,” contracts wherein employees agreed not to join or associate
with a union, were legal and binding by state and federal courts); Loewe v. Lawlor (Danbury
Hatters’ Case), 208 U.S. 274, 292 (1908) (holding that the United Hatters’ nationwide boycott was a restraint on interstate commerce in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act).
50
Danbury Hatters’ Case, 208 U.S. at 293, (holding that both primary and secondary boycotts were actionable in damages pursuant to Section 7 of the Sherman Antitrust Act).
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Although this period was marked by the liberal use of judicial injunctions
to control collective action, some judges began to write passionate dissents recognizing the legal acceptability and social desirability of labor organizations.51
In a dissent that seems strangely prophetic of today’s employment environment, Judge Oliver Wendell Holmes, while sitting on the Massachusetts Supreme Court, wrote:
It is plain from the slightest consideration of practical affairs, or the most superficial reading of industrial history, that free competition means combination, and
that the organization of the world, now going on so fast, means an everincreasing might and scope of combination. . . . Whether beneficial on the
whole, as I think it, or detrimental, it is inevitable, unless the fundamental axioms of society, and even the fundamental conditions of life, are to be changed.
One of the eternal conflicts out of which life is made up is that between the
effort of every man to get the most he can for his services, and that of society,
disguised under the name of capital, to get his services for the least possible return. Combination on the one side is patent and powerful. Combination on the
other is the necessary and desirable counterpart, if the battle is to be carried on
in a fair and equal way.52

Though it was still years from taking hold, the view expressed in Judge
Holmes’ dissent eventually won the day. A system based upon free competition
is strongest when workers, acting in concert with one another, are provided
equal footing with management in the negotiation of the terms and conditions
of their employment. However, absent legislative protections of a worker’s
right to engage in collective action, Judge Holmes’ words would remain purely
prophetic—arguably persuasive, but legally inconsequential.
C. Evolution of Legislative Support
The lack of legislative guidance during this era may indicate “that the legislatures on the whole were satisfied with the results of judicial intervention,”
but it also suggests that organized labor lacked political power or interest.53
Accordingly, most of Congress’s pro-labor legislation during this period was
limited to railway workers,54 but in 1914, the tide shifted significantly when
Congress enacted the Clayton Act.55
51

TAYLOR & WITNEY, supra note 2, at 76–78 (discussing the impact of Holmes’s & Brandeis’s dissents).
52
Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 108 (1896) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
53
Smith, supra note 45, at 1267.
54
See, e.g., Railway Labor Act, ch. 347, 44 Stat. 577–78 (1926) (codified as amended at 45
U.S.C. §§ 151–88 (2012)) (supporting collective bargaining and protecting railway workers’
rights to organize); Erdman Act of 1898, ch. 370, § 10, 30 Stat. 424, 428 (1898) (forbidding
employers in the railroad industry from executing “yellow dog” contracts).
55
Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–19,
21–27 and 29 U.S.C. §§ 52–53 (2012)). Samuel Gompers, the president of the American
Federation of Labor, declared the Clayton Act (Section 6) as “the Magna Carta upon which
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The Clayton Act declared that human labor was not to be considered an article of commerce and that the existence of unions was not to be considered a
violation of antitrust laws.56 In addition, the Act prohibited federal courts from
issuing injunctions in labor disputes except to prevent irreparable injury to
property.57 Congress intended for this prohibition to be absolute when peaceful
picketing and boycotts were involved.58 The Supreme Court, not of the same
opinion, ruled that the Sherman Antitrust Act as amended by the Clayton Act
still permitted employers injunctive relief from secondary boycotts (boycotts
against suppliers or vendors of the employer).59
In 1927, Congress presided over public hearings as it considered introduction of an anti-injunction bill.60 These hearings set the stage for passage of the
NLRA. The Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932 effectively blocked the judiciary
from handing out labor injunctions and from enforcing employment contracts
wherein laborers agreed not to associate with unions (yellow-dog contracts).61
Then in 1933, President Roosevelt’s New Deal plan, which was intended to
spark economic recovery from the Great Depression, gave rise to the National
Industrial Recovery Act (“NIRA”).62 Section 7(a) of NIRA protected workers’
rights to form or join unions of their choosing and to engage in collective bargaining.63
Unfortunately, NIRA failed to specify the very labor practices it purported
to prohibit, and it provided no substantive mechanisms for enforcement.64 The
resulting wave of union unrest and strike activity over that summer prompted
President Roosevelt to create the National Labor Board to interpret and enforce
the new law.65 Though the Board was initially successful in settling the disputes of hundreds of thousands of workers, by February of 1934, the Board was
ineffective and on the verge of collapse.66 Soon thereafter, the U.S. Supreme
Court held NIRA unconstitutional in its entirety.67
the working people will rear their structure of industrial freedom.” DANIEL R. ERNST,
LAWYERS AGAINST LABOR: FROM INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS TO CORPORATE LIBERALISM 165
(1995).
56
Clayton Act § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2012).
57
Clayton Act § 20, 29 U.S.C. § 52 (2012); Bhd. of Maint. of Way Emps. v. Guilford
Transp. Indus., 803 F.2d 1228, 1231 (1st Cir. 1986).
58
See Bhd. of Maint. of Way Emps., 803 F.2d at 1233–34.
59
Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 478–79 (1921) (holding Section 20’s
prohibition on injunctions is to be narrowed to disputes between parties in the proximate relation of employer and employee and not to secondary boycotts).
60
TAYLOR & WITNEY, supra note 2, at 78.
61
Id. at 78–79, 81, 84.
62
Id. at 150.
63
Id. at 151.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id. at 152–53.
67
Id. at 157; A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935).
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Precisely one month later, Congress overwhelmingly passed the National
Labor Relations Act.68 The Act’s preamble declares that it is the policy of the
United States to protect a worker’s full freedom of association, selforganization, and designation of representatives for the purpose of negotiating
the terms and conditions of employment.69 Finally, after years of struggling to
highlight their plight, the laborers who protected their employment with little
more than their endurance of muscle, silence of complaint, and employer’s favor, now had a voice not easily suppressed. The NLRA established the will of
the people, through their Congress, to balance the power dynamics in the employment relationship; Congress’s constitutional authority to regulate interstate
commerce became the vehicle for that reform.70
II. EVOLUTION OF COLLECTIVE ACTION
In 1937, two years after enactment of the NLRA, the Supreme Court ruled
upon the Act’s constitutionality.71 In holding that the Act could be “construed
so as to operate within the sphere of constitutional authority,”72 the Court found
that labor relations had the potential to “burden[] or obstruct[]” interstate commerce.73 The Court then succinctly described the essence of the struggle:
Discrimination and coercion to prevent the free exercise of the right of employees to self-organization and representation is a proper subject for condemnation
by competent legislative authority. Long ago we stated the reason for labor organizations. We said that they were organized out of the necessities of the situation; that a single employee was helpless in dealing with an employer; that he
was dependent ordinarily on his daily wage for the maintenance of himself and
family; that, if the employer refused to pay him the wages that he thought fair,
he was nevertheless unable to leave the employ and resist arbitrary and unfair
treatment; that union was essential to give laborers opportunity to deal on an
equality with their employer.74

For over seventy-eight years, the NLRA has stood for the proposition that
equalizing the bargaining power between labor and management would aid the
flow of commerce. The manner of equalization, borne of industrial-era realities, was collective action through unionization. It is important to note, however, that Congress did not enact the NLRA specifically to sanction unionization
68
The Schecter decision was handed down on May 27, 1935, and the NLRA was passed on
June 27, 1935. TAYLOR & WITNEY, supra note 2, at 157–58.
69
National Labor Relations Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012).
70
“Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employees to organize and
bargain collectively . . . promotes the flow of commerce by removing certain recognized
sources of industrial strife and unrest, . . . and by restoring equality of bargaining power between employers and employees.” Id.
71
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937).
72
Id.
73
Id. at 31–32.
74
Id. at 33.
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per se; rather, the Act was intended to protect the flow of commerce from the
negative effects of unfair labor practices.75 In 1935, a union’s threat to terminate, interrupt, or slow down production was such a formidable hazard, it
served as the single most effective tool to compel that equalization.
Today, the notion that the equalization of bargaining power grows from a
combination of workers beholden to the same employer fails to account for
twenty-first century realities. Given the manner in which globalization, automation, and virtual communities shape today’s employment environment, the
potency of a union’s threat to strike is greatly diminished.76 Of much greater
potency is the diminution of a company’s brand. In an age where information is
king, where “googling” has become a standard part of the lexicon, and where
online posts have the permanency of digital tattoos, companies are more likely
to fear damage to brand than damage to production. Consequently, the NLRB’s
lack of consistent guidance on issues related to viral action frustrates the fundamental goal of the NLRA: to protect the flow of commerce from the negative
effects of unfair labor practices.77
A. Yesterday’s Success, Today’s Reality
In the thirty years immediately following enactment of the NLRA, the Act
was generally successful in achieving its goal.78 Many of the benefits conferred
upon today’s workers grew from these successes and have become so conventional that they are no longer seen as progressive. In fact, legislation administered by designated government agencies now protects many of the terms and
conditions of employment that laborers so vigorously fought to secure.79 Indeed, the NLRB’s website directs aggrieved workers whose complaints do not
fall within the NLRB’s authority to one of seven federal labor agencies or to an

75
National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2012)).
76
“Today, the right to strike is so weak that unions rarely utilize it, and serious efforts are
underway to weaken it further.” Julius G. Getman & F. Ray Marshall, The Continuing Assault on the Right to Strike, 79 TEX. L. REV. 703, 704 (2001).
77
See 49 Stat. at 449.
78
Richard B. Freeman, What Can We Learn from the NLRA to Create Labor Law for the
Twenty-First Century?, 26 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 327, 329 (2011).
79
The Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division oversees complaints related to wages, tips, work hours, overtime, breaks, vacation pay, or the Family Medical Leave Act. See
Related Agencies, NAT’L LAB. REL. BOARD, http://www.nlrb.gov/resources/related-agencies
(last visited Oct. 18, 2014). The Occupational Safety and Health Administration oversees
work-related safety and health issues. Id. Employees discriminated against because of race,
ethnicity, religion, age, gender, national origin or sexual orientation can seek relief through
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Id. Employees discriminated against because of immigration or citizenship status or because of national origin can contact the Department of Justice’s Office of Special Counsel for Immigration-Related Unfair Employment
Practices. Id.
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appropriate state labor office.80 As a result, twenty-first century workers have
several legal mechanisms at their disposal to help combat abuses of worker
rights. Nevertheless, abuses continue.
Take for example the reemergence of garment center sweatshops in the
United States, brought to the public eye in 1995. “In Los Angeles, labor officials discovered a slave-sweatshop where [eighty] Thai immigrants were forced
to sew brand-name clothes in a compound behind razor wire and armed guards.
The workers earned $2 per hour for making clothes later sold at major
stores.”81 Companies unwilling or unable to facilitate such blatantly prohibited,
immoral operations in the United States may try to shield themselves from U.S.
labor laws by offshoring the labor.
In Honduras, girls as young as 13 were found sewing clothing for TV talk-show
host Kathie Lee Gifford’s apparel line sold at Wal-Mart. The girls worked from
7:30am to 9:00pm, Monday through Friday, and because of forced overtime to
meet rush orders, the children were not permitted to attend night school, where
from 6:00 pm to 10:00 pm they could have studied to complete their grammar
school educations.82

Offshoring of unskilled labor, however, may not be sufficient to shield
U.S. corporations from shouldering financial responsibility for tragedies that
occur as a result of negligent operations.
[A Bangladeshi garment worker] demand[s] that Walmart, which, among other
retailers, had clothes manufactured at the facility, pay compensation to victims
like herself and the families of those who died . . . .
....
The disaster at Tazreen was the worst garment factory fire in the history of
Bangladesh. Many of the [112] deceased were burned beyond recognition, and
as many as 53 bodies were buried unclaimed, according to reports in Bangladesh.
The factory’s safety lapses have been well documented. The massive building didn’t have a staircase mounted to the outside for emergency exit, and each
floor had windows securely bolted with iron frames, effectively turning the factory into a cage for workers.83

These examples highlight the inhumane working conditions inflicted upon
industrial workers in the years since enactment of the NLRA. Can it be that the
80

Id.
Background on Sweatshops, DO SOMETHING, http://www.dosomething.org/tipsandtools
/background-sweatshops (last visited Oct. 18, 2014).
82
Id.
83
Dave Jamieson & Emran Hossain, Bangladesh Factory Fire Victim Calls On Walmart to
Pay Compensation, HUFFINGTON POST BUS. (Apr. 12, 2013, 6:11 PM), http://www
.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/12/_n_3071974.html. The local business owner and management team have since been indicted. Farid Ahmed, Bangladesh Court Orders Arrest of Apparel Factory Owner, Five Others, CNN (Dec. 31, 2013, 7:05 AM), http://www.cnn.com
/2013/12/31/world/asia/bangladesh-fire-arrest-orders/.
81
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more things change, the more they stay the same? In truth, one of the most effective strategies for improving egregious terms and conditions of employment
is to shine a light on them. Labor organizers who once stood on public sidewalks in front of factories holding up signs denouncing deplorable conditions,
today can put that same message in front of millions more consumers by posting it online. Today, all David may need to take down Goliath is a smart phone
and a Twitter account.
B. The Twenty-First Century Difference: Viral Action
A key difference between aggrieved employees of the past and aggrieved
employees of today is that today’s employees have extraordinary, high-speed
access to a tremendous number of eyes and ears. The power of social media
coupled with the reach of the World Wide Web enables every employee with a
smart phone, social media account, or Internet access to publish their grievances with blazing speed and ominous longevity. The ubiquity of social media
tools like text messaging, e-mail, photo sharing, social networking, blogs, and
review sites reveals the extraordinary expressive capability supplied by today’s
media landscape.
This capability provides employees with an unprecedented ability to distribute information, organize supporters, and coordinate campaigns. Prior to the
widespread use of social media, access to media was expensive and required
the assistance of professionals to publish, mail, or broadcast messages to the
media’s consumers. Additionally, the effectiveness of these “non-social media”
(NSM) tools was limited to either the distribution of a single message to many
consumers (TV, radio, newspapers, mass mail), or the development of a message with a single consumer (telephone, telegraph, fax). Consequently, labor
organizers endeavoring to develop accurate, compelling messages for mass distribution were encumbered by the many limitations of NSM.
“The media that is good at creating conversations is no good at creating
groups. And the media that is good at creating groups is no good at creating
conversations.”84 In this media landscape, if you wanted to have a conversation, you interacted with one other person; if you wanted to address a group,
you were limited to one message for the entire group. The unfortunate consequence of the “one-to-many” messages delivered via NSM was that organizers
had to write broadly phrased, inexact messages in the hopes of inspiring as
wide-ranging a group as possible. The recipients of these messages were essentially spectators unable to resolve misunderstandings, disagreements, or apprehensions without engaging in a time-consuming, perhaps costly, “one-to-one”
manner of communication.

84

Clay Shirky, How Social Media Can Make History, TED, 03:06 (June 2009), http://
www.ted.com/talks/clay_shirky_how_cellphones_twitter_facebook_can_make_history.html.
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Those days are gone, never to return. Gone are the days when consuming
information was an inherently passive experience. Today, social media tools
permit every media consumer to also be a producer.85 Information sharing has
become so quick, inexpensive, and easy that the spectator paralysis typical of
the NSM consumer has become an unfamiliar concept to members of the former audience.86 “And to put it in one bleak sentence, no medium has ever survived the indifference of 25-year-olds.”87
Media is no longer strictly a source of information; it is now, more and
more, a source of coordination. Labor campaigns have effectively used this
technology to redefine collective action, and their efforts have caused powerful,
multinational corporations to overhaul labor-averse employment policies. As
an example, Wal-Mart, often a target of such efforts, has yielded to public pressure over worker rights and has conceded that it needs to do more in its efforts
to improve its foreign labor standards.88 Today, non-profit pro-labor organizations routinely organize significant support through Facebook, Twitter, and
other social media sites.
Companies, well aware of the power of social media to shape their brands,
spend vast fortunes and significant man-hours each year on elevating their
online image.89 They also must devote resources to the development of social
media policies that will both advance their business interests and protect their
brand.90 Often these two goals are in direct conflict with one another, and often
the resulting policies impermissibly restrict employee rights to engage in collective action.
All the while, the NLRB struggles to define a meaningful Social Media
Policy.

85

See
DAN
GILLMOR,
WE
THE
MEDIA
84
(2004),
available
at
http://www.authorama.com/book/we-the-media.html.
86
Id. at 141 (defining the former audience as a consumer of information who actively engages and contributes to the knowledge store).
87
Decca Aitkenhead, Clay Shirky: ‘Paywall Will Underperform—the Numbers Don’t Add
Up’, GUARDIAN (July 4, 2010), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2010/jul/05
/clay-shirky-internet-television-newspapers.
88
Jessica Wohl, Walmart Promises to Strengthen Supply Chain Safeguards After Bangladesh Factory Fire, HUFFINGTON POST BUS. (Dec. 11, 2012, 1:13 AM), http://www
.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/11/_n_2275783.html.
89
See, e.g., Louise Story, The New Advertising Outlet: Your Life, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14,
2007, at BU3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/14/business/media/14ad.html;
Craig Carter, 15 Viral Marketing Examples over the Past 5 Years, IGNITE SOC. MEDIA (Sept.
18, 2013), http://www.ignitesocialmedia.com/social-media-examples/15-viral-marketing-ex
amples-campaigns-past-5-years/.
90
Spencer Hamer, Creating an Effective Workplace Social Media Policy, BLOOMBERG LAW
(July 29, 2013), http://www.bna.com/creating-an-effective-workplace-social-media-policy/.
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III. DEFINING A MEANINGFUL SOCIAL MEDIA POLICY
The NLRB’s latest report concerning social media cases91 may have done
more to confuse than to clarify what is required for a lawful workplace Social
Media Policy (“SMP”).92 The report provides a series of examples to distinguish lawful SMP provisions from unlawful SMP provisions.93 Unfortunately,
a judicious reading of the report provides little assurance that today’s acceptable SMP will not become tomorrow’s unlawful prohibition of employee rights
to communicate about work-related grievances. Section 7 protects the right of
workers to take collective action to improve their working conditions. Thus, it
protects most employee comments about the terms and conditions of their employment, so long as the comments are not made “solely by and on behalf of
the employee himself” or they are not “mere griping.”94
With such seemingly strong protections in place for employee communications, employers struggle to promulgate failsafe policies designed to promote
workplace civility.95 Additionally, employer policies designed to prevent disclosure of confidential workplace-related information are unlawful unless they
clearly exempt Section 7 activity.96 The unavoidable result is an uneasy tension
between the employers’ business interests and the employees’ right to engage
in collective action to improve working conditions. While the NLRB recognizes this tension, its SMP decisions have done little to relieve it.
Given the substantial authority of the NLRB to declare employer SMPs unlawful,97 many employers must turn to the NLRB’s published decisions, rec-

91

OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, NLRB, MEMORANDUM OM 12-59, REPORT OF THE ACTING
GENERAL COUNSEL CONCERNING SOCIAL MEDIA CASES 2 (May 30, 2012) (construing policies presented in cases before the NLRB).
92
See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, Even If It Enrages Your Boss, Social Net Speech Is Protected, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2013, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/22/
technology/employers-social-media-policies-come-under-regulatory-scrutiny.html (“Even
when you review the [NLRB] rules and think you’re following the mandates, there’s still a
good deal of uncertainty.” (quoting labor attorney Steven M. Swirsky)).
93
See generally OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, supra note 91 (analyzing SMP provisions
reviewed by NLRB).
94
Ann C. McGinley & Ryan P. McGinley-Stempel, Beyond the Water Cooler: Speech and
the Workplace in an Era of Social Media, 30 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 75, 89–90 (2012)
(quoting Wal-Mart, Case 17-CA-25030, Advice Memorandum, at 3 (July 19, 2011)); see
also 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2012) (“It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer . . . to
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title . . . .”).
95
See, e.g., Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37, at 2, 4 (Dec. 14, 2012)
(employer’s “zero tolerance” policy prohibiting “bullying and harassment” does not insulate
it from Section 8 violations); Karl Knauz Motors, Inc., 358 N.L.R.B. No. 164, at 1 (Sept. 28,
2012) (employer’s “Courtesy” rule unlawful because it may chill protected speech).
96
OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, supra note 91, at 5.
97
See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a).
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ommendations, and examples for guidance.98 Ultimately, rules that employees
would reasonably construe “to chill . . . the exercise of their Section 7 rights”
are unlawful.99 Thus, rules that explicitly abridge employees’ ability to discuss
with one another the conditions of their employment are unlawful.100
Rules that do not explicitly restrict these protected activities, however, will
only be deemed unlawful “upon a showing that: (1) employees would reasonably construe the language to prohibit Section 7 activity; (2) the rule was promulgated in response to union activity; or (3) the rule has been applied to restrict
the exercise of Section 7 rights.”101 Furthermore, rules that clearly outline their
purpose and then restrict the scope of their enforcement with well-defined examples of illegal or unprotected conduct are only lawful to the extent that employees would not reasonably construe the rule to cover protected activity.102
A. Defining the Acceptable Confidentiality Standard
Although “[t]he Board has long recognized that employees have a right to
discuss wages and conditions of employment with third parties as well as each
other,”103 the Board also recognizes a legitimate need for employers to keep
certain corporate, financial, or trade information confidential.104 Nevertheless,
absent clear examples or context excepting Section 7 activity, rules similar to
those listed below are overbroad and therefore unlawful105:
•
•
•

98

restrictions on “release [of] confidential guest, team member or company information,” to include employee salary information;106
rules requiring social media interactions be “completely accurate and
not misleading”;107
rules requiring that employees “not . . . reveal non-public company information on any public site.”108 Such nonpublic information includes:
109
o “any topic related to the financial performance of the company”;

See generally OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, supra note 91 (providing framework for
analysis and construction of lawful SMPs).
99
Id. at 3 (quoting Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 N.L.R.B. 824, 825 (1998), enforced, 203 F.3d
52 (D.C. Cir. 1999)).
100
Id. (citing Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia, 343 N.L.R.B. 646, 647 (2004)).
101
Id. (emphasis added).
102
Id. (citing Tradesmen Int’l, 338 N.L.R.B. 460, 460–62 (2002)).
103
Id. at 4 (citing e.g., Cintas Corp., 344 N.L.R.B. 943, 943 (2005), enforced, 482 F.3d 463
(D.C. Cir. 2007)).
104
Id. at 7, 18.
105
See generally id. (construing legality of SMP provisions presented in cases before the
NLRB).
106
Id. at 4.
107
Id. at 6.
108
Id. at 7.
109
Id.
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“information that has not already been disclosed by authorized persons in a public forum”;110
o “personal information about another [Employer] employee, such as
performance, compensation or status in the company”;111 and
112
o “confidential or proprietary” company information.
restrictions on providing such information to blogs, the press, or government agencies;113
“rule[s] that require employees to get permission before reusing others’
content or images,” even where such material is protected by copyright;114 and
“provisions that threaten employees with discharge or criminal prosecution for failing to report unauthorized access to or misuse of confidential information.”115
o

•
•

•

Note the inevitable tension here: the NLRB has recognized the need for
employees to organize and discuss information that the NLRB has recognized
employers may need to keep confidential. Thus, many seemingly sensible employer policies intended to safeguard sensitive company information inevitably
fall short of protecting the employee, the employer, or the information.
B. Defining the Acceptable Civility Standard
Likewise, the NLRB deems rules governing employee civility—absent
clear examples or context excepting Section 7 activity—to be overbroad and
therefore unlawful.116 Employers must carefully construct rules of workplace
civility such that employees are not chilled from engaging in concerted activity.
Accordingly, when devoid of context, rules like the following are unlawful:117
•

•

110

suggestions that employees “resolve concerns about work by speaking
with co-workers, supervisors, or managers” rather than by posting complaints on the Internet;118
“provision[s] prohibiting employees from expressing their personal
opinions to the public regarding the workplace, work satisfaction or dissatisfaction, wages, hours or work conditions”;119

Id.
Id.
112
Id. at 13.
113
Id. at 18–19.
114
Id. at 11.
115
Id. at 5.
116
Id. at 20.
117
See generally id. (construing legality of SMP provisions presented in cases before the
NLRB).
118
Id. at 11.
119
Id. at 14.
111
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provisions “warning employees to avoid harming the image and integrity of the company”;120
restrictions on “negative conversations” about managers or working
conditions;121
“prohibition[s] on making disparaging or defamatory comments.”122

Still, the NLRB recognizes that employers have “a legitimate basis to prohibit [some] workplace communications.”123 As a result, employees can lose
the Act’s protection (even if the SMP provision is found to be unlawful) when
they combine concerted protected activity with egregious behavior, including
displays of an “opprobrious or abusive manner.”124
Finally, the NLRB report concludes that an employer’s use of a “saving
clause”125 does not cure otherwise unlawful provisions, so long as the clause
fails to explain in layperson’s terms what the right to engage in “concerted activity” entails.126
IV. DIFFICULTIES WITH IMPLEMENTING THE NLRB’S SMP GUIDANCE
The NLRB’s attempt at clarifying the requirements for lawful SMPs has
struck some corporate officials as being more about show than substance; more
about “an effort to remain relevant” in the twenty-first century than about protecting collective bargaining rights.127 The Board’s inconsistent adaptation of
the NLRA to social media policies is “causing concern and confusion.”128 This
confusion sprouts from the subjective nature of the unpredictable, fact-specific
analysis found in many NLRB decisions related to social media.
For example, in Karl Knauz Motors, the NLRB found a “Courtesy” rule
unlawful because of its broad prohibition against “disrespectful” conduct and
“language which injures the image or reputation of the [employer].”129 Yet in
Tradesmen International, the Board discusses a series of cases where it viewed
essentially the same facts in the opposite manner when it found rules prohibit-

120

Id. at 13.
Id. (citing Claremont Resort & Spa, 344 N.L.R.B. 832, 836 (2005)).
122
Id. at 17.
123
Id. at 20.
124
Cellco P’ship, 349 N.L.R.B. 640, 646 (2007).
125
A severability clause or “saving clause” is “a provision that keeps the remaining provisions of a contract or statute in force if any portion of that contract or statute is judicially declared void, unenforceable, or unconstitutional.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1498 (9th ed.
2009).
126
OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, supra note 91, at 14 (citing Clearwater Paper Corp., Case
19-CA-064418).
127
See Greenhouse, supra note 92.
128
Id.
129
Karl Knauz Motors, Inc., 358 N.L.R.B. No. 164, at 2 (Sept. 28, 2012).
121
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ing conduct “tending to damage or discredit an employer’s reputation to be
lawful.”130
Employers desirous of providing guidance through SMPs have their hands
tied as they seek to promote civility and decorum in the workplace. On the one
hand, employers are compelled to create policies that outline acceptable behavior;131 on the other, they are constrained by the NLRB’s application of Section
7 to SMPs. “The [NLRB] says workers have a right to discuss work conditions
freely and without fear of retribution, whether the discussion takes place at the
office or on Facebook.”132 Employers, obliged to maintain good-natured work
environments, must read between the lines of the NLRB’s conflicting messages
in order to uncover meaningful solutions.
A. Conflicting Confidentiality Messages
The NLRB’s position on confidentiality policies is firmly rooted in a desire
to ensure that employers do not mislead employees into believing that their
Section 7 rights are somehow restricted.133 A noble desire. NLRB decisions,
however, have not been so stationary. This surreal dichotomy—NLRB’s noble
desire, tainted by nomadic execution—is difficult to reconcile. The NLRB social media report deems unlawful an instruction that employees not “release
confidential guest, team member or company information” because employees
could reasonably interpret it as restricting them from discussing and disclosing
their conditions of employment.134 The NLRB then suggests, however, that
where employers include such a rule within a list of prohibited “egregious conduct,” the surrounding context will preclude employees from reasonably construing the confidentiality rule as restricting Section 7 activity.135
For example, in response to a challenged SMP involving employees posting employer related information to blogs, message boards, social networks,
and other online media, the NLRB issued the following advice136: “A prohibition against ‘negative conversations’ about managers within a list of policies
130

Tradesmen Int’l, 338 N.L.R.B. 460, 462 (2002), quoted in Karl Knauz Motors, 358
N.L.R.B. No. 164, at 4 n.9 (Hayes, Member, dissenting).
131
McGinley & McGinley-Stempel, supra note 94, at 87 (discussing requirement for certain
employer policies mandated by Title VII and the other antidiscrimination statutes).
132
Greenhouse, supra note 92.
133
See generally OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, supra note 91 (analyzing provisions from
SMPs reviewed by NLRB).
134
Id. at 4.
135
Id. at 13–14 (citing Tradesmen Int’l, 338 N.L.R.B. 460, 462).
136
Christine Neylon O’Brien, The First Facebook Firing Case Under Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act: Exploring the Limits of Labor Law Protection for Concerted
Communication on Social Media, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 29, 41 (2011) (referencing Advice
Memorandum, Office of the Gen. Counsel, Sears Holdings (Roebucks), No. 18-CA-19081
(NLRB Dec. 4, 2009) [hereinafter Sears Advice Memo], available at http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov
/link/document.aspx/09031d45802d802f.)
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about working conditions [is] deemed unlawful due to its ‘potential chilling effect.’ ”137 The advice went on to say, “[i]n contrast, a rule that prohibit[s]
statements ‘slanderous or detrimental to the company’ within a list of prohibited conduct including ‘sexual or racial harassment’ and ‘sabotage’ would not
reasonably be understood to restrict section 7 activity because the context
list[s] examples of ‘egregious misconduct.’ ”138
Similarly, the NLRB found a Wal-Mart confidentiality provision lawful
because it contained the following examples of prohibited disclosures: “information regarding the development of systems, processes, products, know-how,
technology, internal reports, procedures, or other internal business-related
communications.”139 It seems odd that such a facile list is sufficient to save an
otherwise unlawful provision. The more convincing analysis suggests that employees could easily construe each of those prohibitions as chilling their right
to discuss the conditions of their employment. In truth, an employee fearful of
a hazardous, disorganized procedure that his employer will soon impose on him
would reasonably construe such a provision as restricting his right to discuss
this procedure with others. Certainly, terms like “other internal business-related
communications” are too broad.
This sort of inconsistency encumbers the employer’s ability and willingness to develop SMPs that adequately protect either the employer’s or the employee’s interests. The NLRB’s insistence that clear examples and proper context will somehow remove ambiguity from rules meant to regulate such
inherently disparate interests, therefore, seems misplaced. For every example of
inappropriate conduct not protected by Section 7, there is a protected example
not far behind. Thus, to be failsafe, SMPs must be overflowing with precise,
detailed examples.
That said, what sort of specificity would be necessary to protect both the
employer’s confidentiality rights and the employee’s Section 7 rights in employment environments like Triangle Waist or Tazreen?
Consider the following scenario: A garment factory in Massachusetts employs several hundred laborers in the production of athletic attire for sale at national retailers. Prior to the start of their employment, each laborer signed a
document indicating their acceptance and understanding of the employer’s social media policy. This policy included a confidentiality clause that prohibited
the disclosure of information regarding the development of systems, processes,
137
Id. at 42 (quoting Sears Advice Memo, supra note 136, at 5 (citing Claremont Resort &
Spa, 344 N.L.R.B. 832, 836 (2005))); see also OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, supra note 91,
at 13 (citing Claremont Resort & Spa, 344 N.L.R.B. 832, 836).
138
O’Brien, supra note 136, at 42 (quoting Sears Advice Memo, supra note 131, at 5–6);
see also OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, supra note 91, at 13–14 (citing Tradesmen Int’l, 338
N.L.R.B. 460, 462).
139
OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, supra note 91, at 20 (citing Walmart, Case 11-CA067171).
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products, know-how, technology, internal reports, or procedures. After working
at the factory for several months, several of the employees began to commiserate with one another about the unsafe, custom-made machinery recently installed on the production line. They discussed ways of bringing their safety
concerns to the attention of management. That night, one of the employees
posted a photograph of the overcrowded production line to his Facebook account. Under the photo he declared, “Someday somebody walking through this
factory is going to get hurt by this crappy machine.” A different employee, unaware of the previous post, posted to his Twitter account a similar photograph
accompanied by the statement, “We should not have to work under these unsafe conditions.” A week later, they both were fired.
The current state of NLRB jurisprudence would seem to indicate that although both employees were engaged in concerted activity, only the second
employee’s post would receive protection under the NLRA.140 In Five Star
Transportation, the NLRB found that of eleven letters written by a group of
school bus drivers and sent to the School District as part of a letter-writing
campaign, only six were entitled to protection.141 The NLRB separated the
eleven drivers into three groups, based on their individual letters.142 In analyzing the first group, the Board found that the relationship between the content of
the employees’ letters and their status as employees in search of mutual aid or
protection was so attenuated that they were not entitled to the Act’s protection.143
In the case of [the first group of drivers], we find that the content of their letters was not sufficiently related to the drivers’ terms and conditions of employment to constitute protected conduct. In their letters, [they] focused solely on
general safety concerns and did not indicate that their concerns were related to
the safety of the drivers as opposed to others. . . . Further, we are not persuaded
that these two letters should be interpreted as raising the drivers’ common concerns simply because they were written as part of the drivers’ letter-writing
campaign. Instead, we determine whether certain communications are protected
by examining the communications themselves.144

This treatment does not bode well for social media posts. The very nature
of social media is antithetical to a system that confers protection by examining
individual communications excised from their respective campaigns (their context). The astounding influence of social media campaigns derives from social
media’s revolutionary distribution scheme. Every individual with access to the
network is essentially a multi-national publisher. Every individual with access
140

The above scenario is loosely based on the facts of Five Star Transportation, and the
NLRB’s response indicated here is consistent with that holding. See Five Star Transp., Inc.,
349 N.L.R.B. 42 (2007).
141
Id. at 44–47.
142
Id. at 44.
143
Id.
144
Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
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to the network can potentially advance an expression to a very large group of
people; each recipient can in turn respond to the sender, to any other individual
group member, to the entire group, or to an entirely new group. This one-tomany, many-to-one, many-to-many approach to distribution makes the NLRB’s
individual communication analysis unwieldy, impractical, and unrealistic. After
all, a single post divorced from its contextual underpinnings may suggest a
meaning entirely dissimilar from what was intended.
As for the hypothetical garment factory’s SMP, the confidentiality clause
appears to be lawful as it essentially mirrors the acceptable Wal-Mart policy
above. Thus, any violation of the policy could rightfully serve as a terminable
offense (unless the violation qualified for NLRA protection for some other reason). That said, the employer’s authority here quickly becomes uncertain with
the addition of a third, fourth, or fifth employee who refused to respond to the
posts because they feared doing so would violate the confidentiality clause.145
The chilling effect of this policy would presumably render the policy unlawful
and preclude the company from using it as a means to terminate any of the employees. Employees who successfully link their fear of concerted activity—and
their resulting inactivity—to an employer’s social media policy have likely
struck the Achilles’ heel of the offending policy. However, this ‘chilling effect’
doctrine poses two problems. For the discouraged employee, the problem is
that deterred activity is difficult to confirm. For the employer, the problem is
that the level of SMP specificity required to prevent unauthorized disclosure of
sensitive information while not discouraging concerted activity is unfathomable.
Nevertheless, specificity remains a fundamental element of the ideal SMP,
and labor lawyers are wrestling with how to best advise clients on the NLRB
guidance. SMPs must be more specific; they must go beyond simply barring
workers from posting confidential information, advises labor lawyer Denise M.
Keyser.146 Ms. Keyser recommends explicitly restricting disclosure of “trade
secrets, product introduction dates or private health details.”147 But not even
specificity, according to labor lawyer Steven M. Swirsky, can keep employers
from crossing the legal line.148 “Even when you review the [NLRB] rules and
think you’re following the mandates, there’s still a good deal of uncertainty.”149
This uncertainty, unfortunately, is not constrained to policies barring disclosure
of confidential information.

145

See Karl Knauz Motors, Inc., 358 N.L.R.B. No. 164, at 2 (Sept. 28, 2012) (citing “Board
precedent holding that an employer rule is unlawful if employees would reasonably understand it to apply to protected activity.”).
146
Greenhouse, supra note 92.
147
Id.
148
Id.
149
Id. (quoting Swirsky).
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B. Conflicting Civility Messages
Uncertainty is similarly pervasive in NLRB decisions involving social media policies related to workplace civility. Anti-discrimination statutes incentivize employers to protect themselves from claims by implementing policies to
regulate harassing, discriminatory, and hostile employee speech—whether it
occurs at work or online.150 Apparently sympathetic to this need, the NLRB
endorsed an employer’s “Be Respectful” rule and, in so doing, stated that “[t]he
Employer has a legitimate basis to prohibit such workplace communications.”151
The policy advised against posts that “could be viewed as malicious, obscene, threatening or intimidating,” and it explained that “prohibited ‘harassment or bullying’ [includes] ‘offensive posts meant to intentionally harm
someone’s reputation’ or ‘posts that could contribute to a hostile work environment on the basis of race, sex, disability, religion or any other status protected by law or company policy.’ ”152 It is not difficult to understand why such
civility policies are necessary, and in some cases required by law, but it is difficult to understand the Board’s tendency to contravene both precedent and public policy when resolving civility complaints.
The Board’s mistreatment of a social media expression’s evolution into
demonstrable collective action seems to be at the core of the uncertainty. The
social media expression’s metamorphosis invariably commences with the ruminations of a single employee who seeks out understanding and support from
his friends, family, and peers. This search for understanding and support begins
with conversations within the employee’s community, and then evolves into
organization, collaboration, and eventually collective action. In the past, the
disgruntled employees’ understanding of their rights, their options, and their
shared anguish required a time consuming, imprecise pursuit, and any subsequent organization or collaboration was additionally time consuming and
fraught with impending termination if exposed. Today, the World Wide Web’s
effortless capabilities mean that community is global, understanding is searchable, and support is predictable. Consequently, the Board must reexamine how
it evaluates the employee’s search for understanding and support.
C. The Search for Understanding: Mere Griping or Initiating Group Action
In a 2012 case, Hispanics United of Buffalo, an employer’s “zero tolerance” policy on bullying and harassment used substantially similar language to

150

McGinley & McGinley-Stempel, supra note 94, at 86–87 (discussing affirmative defenses through employer policies).
151
OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, supra note 91, at 20.
152
Id. (quoting a sample SMP).
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the “Be Respectful” policy endorsed in the NLRB report,153 yet the Board determined that the policy was not a valid justification for the discharge of five
employees who allegedly harassed another online.154 The Board affirmed the
Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) finding that the allegedly harassing online
behavior was protected concerted activity and that there was “no rational basis”
for concluding that the behavior violated the policy.155 The dissent, however,
articulated the view that the employees were legally terminated because their
online behavior never rose above mere griping.156 The divergent views expressed in these conflicting opinions are indicative of the Board’s misunderstanding of the evolution of a social media expression.
If administrative law judges, NLRB members, and employers are unable to
agree on the applicability of an employer’s “zero tolerance” courtesy policy to
an employee’s behavior, it is disingenuous to assume that aggrieved employees
can. Employees who are bullied or harassed in the workplace often find it difficult to describe their experience in a way that sounds plausible to themselves or
others.157 Yet the reality is that large numbers of employees have experienced
workplace bullying.158 “[B]ullying is a pervasive problem and not just the rare
experience of a few ‘thin-skinned’ employees.”159 Employees subjected to
abuse struggle to make sense of their experience and often blame themselves
for being targeted.160
Social media conversations facilitate targeted group discussion, much like
a focus group, and provide employees with the tools to identify, manage, and
bring to an end the abusive conditions of their employment. Employees who
reach out to similarly situated members of their online community may experience a synergy known as group effect that “occurs when participants hear others’ verbalized experiences that, in turn, stimulate memories, ideas, and experiences in themselves.”161 From this group conversation employees may discover
a common language to vocalize their shared experience, and they may find validation in discovering that they are not alone.162
The Board’s analysis of whether an abused employee’s statements surpass
mere griping may have just as chilling an effect on an employee’s willingness
153

Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37, at 10 (Dec. 14, 2012); OFFICE OF
supra note 91, at 22–23.
154
Hispanics United, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37, at 10.
155
Id. at 4, 10.
156
Id. at 4 (Hayes, Member, dissenting).
157
Sarah J. Tracy et al., Nightmares, Demons, and Slaves: Exploring the Painful Metaphors
of Workplace Bullying, 20 MGMT. COMM. Q. 148, 149 (2006).
158
“From 25% to 30% of U.S. employees are bullied and emotionally abused sometime during their work histories—10% at any given time.” Id.
159
Id.
160
Id. at 154.
161
Id. at 155.
162
Id.
THE GEN. COUNSEL,
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to engage in concerted activity as any offending civility policy. Employees
prohibited or hindered from posting their gripes online may never discover that
common language that appropriately elevates their concern above a gripe.
Their semantic ignorance becomes a cause for termination (if they post) or further isolation (if they do not). Unfortunately for them, “[i]solation can serve as
a punishment and further complicate targets’ efforts at collective resistance.”163
D. The Search for Support: Sharing a Common Viewpoint or Preparation for
Group Action
The Board’s misunderstanding of the evolution of the social media expression is further evidenced by the analysis in Karl Knauz Motors. The NLRB declared a “Courtesy” rule unlawful because of its broad prohibition against “disrespectful” conduct and “language which injures the image or reputation of the
[employer].”164 The Board explained that employees could interpret the policy
as restricting them from engaging in “protected statements—whether to
coworkers, supervisors, managers, or third parties who deal with the [employer]—that object to their working conditions and seek the support of others in
improving them.”165 In this statement, the Board acknowledges the Act’s protection of expressions made to third parties if the statement’s purpose is to improve employment conditions.
The two expressions at issue in Karl Knauz Motors were posted to the employee’s Facebook page. The first expression, deemed concerted activity, included a series of sarcastic, pointed comments below photographs of the food
and beverages available at the BMW dealership’s sales event. One of those
comments said,
No, that’s not champagne or wine, it’s 8 oz. water. Pop or soda would be out
of the question. In this photo, [a salesperson] is seen coveting the rare vintages
of water that were available for our guests.
. . . This is not a food event. What ever made you realize that?166

The second expression, deemed not to be concerted activity, was in reference to a photograph of a car accident involving another one of the employer’s
salespeople who had permitted a customer’s 13-year-old son to sit behind the
wheel of a brand new Land Rover.167 The comment stated,
This is what happens when a sales Person [sic] sitting in the front passenger
seat (Former Sales Person, actually) allows a 13 year old boy to get behind the
wheel of a 6000 lb. truck built and designed to pretty much drive over anything.

163
164
165
166
167

Id. at 168.
Karl Knauz Motors, Inc., 358 N.L.R.B. No. 164, at 1 (Sept. 28, 2012).
Id.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 7.
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The kid drives over his father’s foot and into the pond in all about 4 seconds and
destroys a $50,000 truck. OOOPS!168

The day after the accident, because she permitted a child to sit behind the
wheel of an unsecured vehicle, the dealership stripped the careless salesperson
of her “demo” vehicle and her monthly gas and insurance allowance. The dealership then provided her a used car and a $500 “demo allowance” until she was
able to purchase her own vehicle.169
The ALJ determined that the first statement qualified for protection of the
Act because concerted activity may include individual activity where “individual employees seek to initiate or to induce or to prepare for group action, as
well as individual employees bringing truly group complaints to the attention
of management.”170 The ALJ was satisfied that, in spite of the absence of an
expressed common cause amongst fellow employees, the postings stemmed
from, or logically grew from, prior employee conversations.171 In contrast, the
ALJ found that the second expression was neither protected nor concerted activity.172
It was posted solely by [the aggrieved employee], apparently as a lark, without
any discussion with any other employee of the [employer], and had no connection to any of the employees’ terms and conditions of employment. It is so obviously unprotected that it is unnecessary to discuss whether the mocking tone of
the posting further affects the nature of the posting.173

Consequently, a sarcastic comment about customers deprived of wine and
champagne found protection in the Act because fellow employees had discussed it, and it could remotely influence the dealership’s image.174 Yet, a
pointed jab at a crippling injury inflicted upon a customer by a poorly trained
salesperson is “obviously unprotected” because there was no employee conversation about it. This sort of circular logic is particularly dangerous when applied to social media posts. Board precedent is clear; concerted activity may
include individual activity where “individual employees seek to initiate or to
induce or to prepare for group action.”175 There is no requirement that preparation for group action include prior employee discussion. On this too, Board
precedent is clear, the object or goal of initiating, inducing or preparing for
group action does not have to be stated explicitly when employees communi168

Id. at 8.
Id. at 7 n.2.
170
Id. at 10 (quoting Meyers Indus., Inc. (Meyers II), 281 N.L.R.B. 882, 887 (1986)).
171
Id. (citing NLRB v. Mike Yurosek & Son, 53 F.3d 261, 265 (9th Cir. 1995)).
172
Id. at 10–11.
173
Id. at 11.
174
“[T]here may have been some customers who were turned off by the food offerings at
the event and either did not purchase a car because of it, or gave the salesperson a lowering
[sic] rating in the Customer Satisfaction Rating because of it; not likely, but possible.” Id. at
10.
175
Meyers Indus. (Meyers II), 281 N.L.R.B. 882, 887 (1986).
169
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cate.176 By posting both expressions—on the same day—the employee was engaging his community in a conversation related to the conditions of his employment. To believe otherwise is to believe that the employee had somehow
utterly disassociated the champagne event, which he perceived as a management failure, from the Land Rover event, which he perceived as a management
failure.
Such a belief misconstrues how conversations occur on social media. By
viewing two social media posts made by the same person, on the same day,
about the same topic in isolation from one another, the NLRB is essentially
reading two random, disjointed pages of a novel and construing two plots. The
overwhelming volume and speed of social media information exchanges requires that seemingly disorganized conversations not be excised from their context.
A powerful global conversation has begun. Through the Internet, people are
discovering and inventing new ways to share relevant knowledge with blinding
speed. As a direct result, markets are getting smarter—and getting smarter faster
than most companies.
These markets are conversations. Their members communicate in language
that is natural, open, honest, direct, funny, and often shocking. Whether explaining or complaining, joking or serious, the human voice is unmistakably genuine.
It can’t be faked.177

A conversation that occurs in person or via an NSM tool is contextually
fluid because the conversation is encapsulated within the confines of its transmission. A conversation that takes place through social media often has neither
a discernable start nor a discernable conclusion. While judicial economy requires lines be drawn, the NLRB needlessly blurs those lines when it extricates
expressions posted on the same day, on the same topic, by the same poster.
At bottom, employers have a legitimate need to develop policies that discourage the abusive behaviors that negatively influence workplace productivity, and the NLRB has a responsibility to protect the employee’s right to “enlist[] the support of his fellow employees for their mutual aid and
protection.”178 Regrettably, when the Board evaluates employee behavior divorced from context, the Board’s treatment fails to advance either the employee’s Section 7 rights or the employer’s need to protect confidential data and
manage workplace civility.
Consider, for example, the contradictory decision rendered in Karl Knauz.
In declaring the employer’s SMP unlawful, the Board explained, “an employee
reading this rule would reasonably assume that [the employer] would regard
statements of protest or criticism as ‘disrespectful’ or ‘injur[ious] [to] the im176

Whittaker Corp., 289 N.L.R.B. 933, 933 (1988).
RICK LEVINE ET AL., THE CLUETRAIN MANIFESTO: THE END OF BUSINESS AS USUAL, at xxi
(2001).
178
Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. NLRB, 407 F.2d 1357, 1365 (4th Cir. 1969).
177
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age or reputation of the [employer].’ ”179 Yet, in concluding that this policy
would chill Section 7 activity, the Board seemingly disregarded its earlier finding that the terminated employee was fully engaged in Section 7 activity during
the posting that resulted in his termination.180 Evidently, the employee did not
consider the policy to chill Section 7 activity. This result is difficult to reconcile. This is especially true given the Board’s more sensible conclusion in Sears
Holdings that where employees continued to engage in Section 7 activities
online in spite of a policy against it, the offending policy language was lawful
because there was no evidence that employees’ Section 7 rights were chilled.181
If the rights of both employees and employers are to be secured, the NLRB
must promote policies that focus on informing employees of their protected
Section 7 rights, and then steadfastly hold employees accountable for brandshaping expressions that fall outside of those rights. The goal, after all, is to
protect the flow of commerce from the negative effects of unfair labor practices;182 the goal is not to stifle commerce with decisions rooted in cherry-picked
facts and circumstances.
V. EMPLOYER PROTECTION: THE OPPROBRIOUS CONDUCT EXCEPTION
Some experts believe a well-structured social-media policy that clearly
characterizes what is and is not appropriate social media behavior is an employer’s best defense against legal action.183 This policy, they suggest, must
then become the focus of employee and employer training sessions in order to
ensure understanding and compliance.184 Given the complexity of the Board’s
treatment of concerted activity, the ironclad SMP appears to be both elusive
and improbable. Adding to the confusion, even where the Board deems an employer’s social media policy unlawful, the employer may still properly terminate the employee if his or her behavior crosses the line.185 That line, delineating protected concerted activity from unprotected concerted activity, is found
through a balancing of the Atlantic Steel factors.186

179

Karl Knauz Motors, 358 N.L.R.B. No. 164, at 1 (second and third alteration in original).
OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, NLRB, MEMORANDUM OM 11-74, REPORT OF THE
ACTING GENERAL COUNSEL CONCERNING SOCIAL MEDIA CASES 8 (Aug. 18, 2011) (indicating
NLRB’s conclusion that of the two Facebook posts the employee made, one was protected
concerted activity).
181
Sears Advice Memo, supra note 136, at 6.
182
See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012).
183
Jeanette Borzo, Employers Tread a Minefield: Firings for Alleged Social-Media Infractions Sometimes Backfire on Companies, WALL ST. J. ONLINE (Jan. 21, 2011, 12:01 AM),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748703954004576089850685724570.
184
Id.
185
Atl. Steel Co., 245 N.L.R.B. 814, 816 (1979) (identifying the factors related to losing the
Act’s protection).
186
Id.
180

15 NEV. L.J. 354 - LOGAN.DOCX

Fall 2014]

SOCIAL MEDIA & CONCERTED ACTIVITY

3/4/2015 2:54 PM

383

[E]ven an employee who is engaged in concerted protected activity can, by opprobrious conduct, lose the protection of the Act.
The decision as to whether the employee has crossed that line depends on
several factors: (1) the place of the discussion; (2) the subject matter of the discussion; (3) the nature of the employee’s outburst; and (4) whether the outburst
was, in any way, provoked by an employer’s unfair labor practice.187

The NLRB has struggled to adequately define the parameters of the first
and third of the Atlantic Steel factors. As to the first factor, the Board has concluded that the place of discussion should weigh against NLRA protection
where opprobrious or abusive comments are made in the presence of other employees.188 This factor, it seems, heavily weighs against the protection of social
media posts. Especially given that the NLRA broadly defines employee as “includ[ing] any employee, and shall not be limited to the employees of a particular employer.”189 It is therefore difficult to envision a social media post that
would qualify as falling outside the presence of other employees.
As to the third factor, appellate review has rejected the Board’s suggestion
that employees engaging in protected activity “could not be dismissed unless
they were involved in flagrant, violent, or extreme behavior.”190 Consequently,
where “an employee is fired for denouncing a supervisor in obscene, personally-denigrating, or insubordinate terms . . . then the nature of his outburst
properly counts against according him the protection of the Act.”191
The question then becomes one of how obscene, personally denigrating, or
insubordinate behaviors should be defined. In a year where the tail end of the
baby boomers are turning fifty and the leading edge of the millennials are running Fortune 500 companies,192 it is unlikely that a meaningful harmony of understanding exists between the NLRB, the employer, and the employee. In fact,
employers who require the same level of maturity from millennial workers as
was expected of them find it difficult to manage (or even understand) today’s
workforce.193 What’s more, the rapid-fire, acerbic quality of many social media
187

Id.
Felix Indus. v. NLRB, 251 F.3d 1051, 1054 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
189
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2012).
190
Felix Indus., 251 F.3d at 1055.
191
Id.
192
See, e.g., Shama Hyder, Study Reveals Surprising Facts About Millennials in the Workplace, FORBES (Dec. 5, 2013, 10:43 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/shamakabani/2013
/12/05/study-reveals-surprising-facts-about-millennials-in-the-workplace/ (defining millennials as those born in the 80’s and 90’s); Fortune’s 40 Under 40: 2013, FORTUNE,
http://archive.fortune.com/magazines/fortune/40-under-40/2013/full_list/ (last visited Oct.
19, 2014).
193
“Employers, coaches, teachers, and parents are ‘hunting’ for an elusive maturity that,
frankly, is hard to find.” TIM ELMORE, ARTIFICIAL MATURITY: HELPING KIDS MEET THE
CHALLENGE OF BECOMING AUTHENTIC ADULTS 2 (2012). “68% of corporate recruiters say
that it is difficult for their organizations to manage millennials.” Hyder, supra note 192.
188
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expressions reflects the reality of a generation that grew up in an age where
feedback has always been instantaneous, public, and largely sarcastic.
For the employer, protecting its brand from the hazards of insubordinate or
malicious employee expressions, which have the potential to go viral with blazing speed, is a valid concern. In a world overexposed to information and underexposed to real-life experience, social media expressions can reflect information rich convictions deprived of genuine understanding.194 Today’s ememployees often suffer from a sort of “Google reflex”; the curse of which is
that the speed at which data—devoid of experience—can be accessed has “paradoxically slowed down . . . actual maturity.”195 What is more, employees who
have extensive social media networks and who are accustomed to high-speed
information exchanges may experience a phenomenon that psychologists refer
to as “high arrogance, low self-esteem.”196 These employees unconsciously
present themselves as mean-spirited and self-absorbed.197 Their rapid-fire expressions motivated by little more than “a primitive impulse to respond” to the
unremitting influx of texts, tweets, and Facebook updates.198 The resulting expressions—“bursts of information”—evidence the consequences of social media distraction: “low creativity, lack of focus, and an inability to be totally in
the moment.”199 The danger of such expressions to an employer’s brand is palpable, and where that expression grows from malicious or insubordinate animus, the NLRA must not serve as a shield for the attacking employee.
The NLRB attempts to identify obscene, malicious, or insubordinate conduct by examining the tone of the employee’s expression. That examination of
tone begins with an analysis of whether the employee’s behavior can be viewed
as “public disparagement of the employer’s product or an undermining of its
reputation.”200 It is not difficult to understand an employer’s desire to minimize
the negative effects of these potentially brand-damaging statements. In spite of
its goal to protect the flow of commerce from the negative effects of unfair labor practices, the NLRB’s decisions tend to favor protecting employee expressions. The resulting panoply of decisions is not easily applied to the overwhelming reach of social media expressions.
Those decisions favoring employee expression over employer reputation
focus more on employee purpose than on employee tone. As a result, the way
an employee communicates seems to carry less weight than whether the employee’s expression can be definitively linked to improving a condition of their
194

See ELMORE, supra note 193, at 4.
Id.
196
Id. at 20.
197
Id. at 21.
198
Id. at 26.
199
Id. at 26–27.
200
Allied Aviation Serv. Co., 248 N.L.R.B. 229, 231 (1980) (quoting Veeder-Root Co., 237
N.L.R.B 1175, 1177 (1978)).
195
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employment. “[A]bsent a malicious motive, [an employee’s] right to appeal to
the public is not dependent on the sensitivity of [the employer] to [the employee’s] choice of forum.”201 Furthermore, a “mocking and sarcastic tone,” without more, is not sufficient to deprive an expression of the Act’s protection,202
nor is the use of “satire and irony,” rather than “a more neutral factual recitation of [employee] dissatisfaction.”203 The use of “unpleasantries uttered in the
course of otherwise protected concerted activity do[es] not strip away the Act’s
protection.”204 Thus, referring to supervisors as “a—hole[s]”205 and calling the
company’s chief executive officer a “cheap son of a bitch”206 did not lose the
Act’s protection.207
Those decisions favoring employer reputation over employee expression,
by contrast, focus on a disloyalty analysis. The Supreme Court articulated this
disloyalty doctrine in 1953 when it upheld Jefferson Standard, an NLRB decision that legitimatized the discharge of employees who distributed handbills
sharply critical of their employer.208 In so holding, the Court reasoned that
Congress did not intend Section 7 to “weaken the underlying contractual bonds
and loyalties of employer and employee.”209 The Court emphasized that “[t]he
legal principle that insubordination, disobedience or disloyalty is adequate
cause for discharge is plain enough.”210 While NLRB decisions since Jefferson
Standard have increasingly broadened the employees’ right to criticize their
employer, comments directed at third-parties may still lose protection if the
motives are found to be disloyal.211 For instance, in Five Star Transportation,
employee letters mailed to the school board characterized the employer as a
“substandard company” that was “so reckless that they have employed alcohol
abusers, drug offenders, child molesters, and persons that have had their license
suspended.”212 In finding that these letters were unprotected, the court stated,
“[i]t matters not whether the communications were true or false.”213 Although
the Board recognized that the statements referenced a labor dispute, it did not
201

Richboro Cmty. Mental Health Council, Inc., 242 N.L.R.B. 1267, 1268 (1979).
Karl Knauz Motors, Inc., 358 N.L.R.B. No. 164, at 10 (Sept. 28, 2012).
203
Pontiac Osteopathic Hosp., 284 N.L.R.B. 442, 452 (1987) (employees authored a fake
newsletter employing satire and irony to mock the employer and its administrators).
204
Timekeeping Sys., Inc., 323 N.L.R.B. 244, 249 (1997).
205
U.S. Postal Serv., 241 N.L.R.B. 389, 390 (1979).
206
Groves Truck & Trailer, 281 N.L.R.B. 1194, 1194–95 (1986).
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consider the reference strong enough to overcome the “inflammatory language”
used by the employees “intended to damage the [employer’s] reputation.”214
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit’s summary of the state of the law in 1989 is
remarkably cogent and supportive of non-malicious employee expressions related to improving the terms and conditions of employment.
In summary, the disloyalty standard is at base a question of whether the employees’ efforts to improve their wages or working conditions through influencing strangers to the labor dispute were pursued in a reasonable manner under the
circumstances. Product disparagement unconnected to the labor dispute, breach
of important confidences, and threats of violence are clearly unreasonable ways
to pursue a labor dispute. On the other hand, suggestions that a company’s
treatment of its employees may have an effect upon the quality of the company’s
products, or may even affect the company’s own viability are not likely to be
unreasonable, particularly in cases when the addressees of the information are
made aware of the fact that a labor dispute is in progress. Childish ridicule may
be unreasonable, while heated rhetoric may be quite proper under the circumstances. Each situation must be examined on its own facts, but with an understanding that the law does favor a robust exchange of viewpoints.215

These seemingly contradictory assessments of opprobrious conduct make
the creation of a properly fashioned social media policy that bars personally
denigrating and insubordinate comments an insufferable task. The difficulty is
that there is very little an employer can do to insulate itself from public disparagement of its products and services. Any social media policy that strives to
restrict employees from posting potentially damaging expressions is unlikely to
survive a challenge rooted in a properly coordinated, appropriately phrased attack on terms and conditions of employment. It is important to note, however,
that an appropriately phrased attack is more about semantics than temperament.
The NLRB will likely consider an attack on an employer’s operations or management as protected, regardless of inflammatory language, so long as the expression links the non-malicious attack to the employee’s terms and conditions
of employment. On the other hand, the NLRB will likely dismiss the very same
grievance, regardless of conciliatory language, if the link is not conclusive.
Consequently, the employer’s protection from damage to brand caused by the
opprobrious conduct of its employees is tenuous at best.
Employers today are justifiably baffled by the suggestions, the decisions,
and the options.
CONCLUSION
In the Gilded Age, the extremes of industrialism exposed scores of laborers
to grossly unfair labor practices. These laborers struggled to shine a light on
their exploitation, but in those days, galvanizing the support necessary to affect
214
215
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change was time-consuming, complicated, and expensive. Getting a message to
a substantial audience required a printing press; getting a message to a national
audience required a newspaper. This hurdle was difficult to overcome, as many
of the large newspapers of this era were not sympathetic to organized labor’s
message. With no other way to circulate a message to provoke change, the
message failed to thrive. For these aggrieved laborers, there was no reprieve in
the nation’s high regard for protected speech. After all, in these early days of
the labor movement, “[f]reedom of the press [was] guaranteed only to those
who own[ed] one.”216
With enactment of the NLRA in 1935, employees for the first time had a
mechanism which could secure their right to engage in concerted activities for
the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. While
the Act did not dictate terms and conditions of employment, or even compel
employers to reach agreement with their employees, it did allow for legitimate
use of the strike weapon. By protecting the right of laborers to organize and
strike, the NLRA provided employees with a substantial mechanism to mitigate
the inequality of bargaining power between employees and employers. Where
these laborers lacked an effective method for eliciting public support through
widespread distribution of their grievance, their newfound right to strike became their most powerful weapon. “The strike plays the same role in labor negotiations that warfare plays in diplomatic negotiations. It facilitates agreement
precisely because the consequences of failure are serious, unpleasant, and costly.”217
In the seventy-eight years since enactment of the NLRA, organized labor
campaigns have secured a variety of significant terms and conditions of employment. In fact, federal and state labor laws now compel many of these employment terms, and administrative agencies supervise their enforcement. Additionally, in the seventy-eight years since enactment of the NLRA,
technological advances have revolutionized the way information is shared, the
way groups organize, and the way communities converse. Gone are the days
where freedom of the press was only guaranteed to those who owned one.
Where once few would argue whether the pen was mightier than the sword, today, few should argue social media’s might.
However, not all that glitters in the twenty-first century cloud is protected.
The protection of an employee’s right to engage in concerted activities through
social media is little more than an illusion; behind the curtain exists nothing
more than a razor-thin barrier between protected speech and termination. While
the NLRB has made clear that employer policies designed to regulate online
expression must clearly exempt Section 7 activity from every provision, the re216
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ality is that employers must move beyond workplace policies so stuffed with
examples and context that they have become too large to read. Social media users predisposed to communicating 140 characters at a time are not likely to
read, or understand, such bloated hyperbole.
The NLRB’s outdated interpretation of collective action encumbers the
rights of both employees and employers. Employees seeking to improve the
conditions of their employment should not be disadvantaged by the realities of
twenty-first century expression and collaboration. At the same time, employers
intent on protecting their business interests from the negative effects of brandshaping campaigns, orchestrated by disgruntled employees, should not be prevented from implementing confidentiality and civility policies.
The answer, it seems, is quite simple. Any employer policy that regulates
the expressions of employees must begin by clearly defining protected Section
7 activities, and then end by outlining the employer policies that regulate unprotected activities. An SMP that focuses more on explaining Section 7 employee rights and less on cataloging the requisite examples of prohibited egregious misconduct serves the needs of both employees and employers. Thus, the
NLRB must consistently uphold policies that focus on informing employees of
their protected Section 7 rights, and then steadfastly hold employees accountable for brand-shaping expressions that fall outside of those rights.
The goal, after all, is to protect the flow of commerce from the negative effects of unfair labor practices; the goal is not to stifle commerce with inconsistent, unpredictable governance of social media expressions.

